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Abstract
In this paper I build a simpli¯ed model of the remuneration structure of a private
equity fund using option theory. This model is then used to analyze the relative
importance of the ¯xed and variable fee parts. The model is complemented with a
structural model to evaluate the ¯nancial choices of private equity fund managers.
It turns out that the control over the ¯nancial structure is valuable to the fund
manager, hence creating a con°ict of interests.
From the fund managers point of view the increased expected fee resulting from
the independent control over the ¯nancial structure of the fund is at some point
o®-set by the increasing risk in the fund. This creates a static trade-o® point for a
one fund manager. For a fund manager with future fund projects, there is also a
dynamic trade-o® between current expected fee and the ability to raise future funds.
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The empirical evidence on the costs of investing in private equity funds1 indicate that it
is costly. The present value of all the fees charged by the mean buy-out fund studied by
Metrick and Yasuda (2009) is 17.80 USD per invested 100 USD. Phalippou and Gottschalg
(2009) ¯nds that the total fee bill is more than 25 percent of the value invested, which they
translate to 6 percent per year. Both these studies use actual data to evaluate the cost of
private equity investments. As a comparison on the costs of investing, Khorana, Servaes
and Tufano (2007) ¯nds the total expense ratio for an average mutual fund in the United
States to be 1.11 percent per year. One part of the fee structure is typically dependent
on performance and it is thus possible to use options theory to determine an expected
cost of investing in private equity fund. I design a model based on options theory that
can validate the empirical fee ¯ndings and disentangle the fee structure, i.e. separate the
¯xed and variable parts. Further, I combine the model with structural model to evaluate
the impact of increasing leverage on the expected fee. There are number of uses for a
model to calculate the expected fee of a private equity investment;
² the model can be used to get an estimate of the expected fee costs from a private
equity investment,
² reversely, the model can be used by a private equity fund manager to design his fee
structure,
² the model makes it possible to compare fund costs against the costs for other invest-
ments, even if the fee structure is not the same, and
² it can be used to study how the incentive structure of private equity fund managers
might in°uence decisions on ¯nancial structure.
To the best of my knowledge there are no explicit models available to calculate the
expected cost before investing in a private equity fund. There is empirical evidence for
funds raised from primarily one investor between 1993 and 2006 in Metrick and Yasuda
(2009). For an investor the speci¯c fund characteristics has to be covered in the empirical
data for it to be useful in an investment situation. Without a model to estimate the
costs the ex ante analysis before investing is di±cult for investors and specialist fund
evaluation ¯rms (gatekeepers). It is not even certain that the empirical results of earlier
studies can give guidance. The private equity industry is fairly new in its current design,
so the time period studied in the empirical studies might not be representative for other
investments.2 This design is yet untested in some economic climates, and it is yet to be
1Private equity funds are venture capital or buy-out focused. Venture capital is typically investing
in early stage development of ¯rms. Buy-out funds focus on buying companies from exchanges, group
companies from large groups etc.
2The fee structure is a way to divide gains between capital and labor. The division of capital and
labor income in ways similar to the fee structure of private equity funds can be traced back in history to,
at least, the Italian commenda in medieval times according to Brouwer (2005).
1seen if the private equity model survives the current downturn or have to be remodeled as
was the case for the LBO industry in the early 90ies which preceded the buy-out part of
the private equity industry. Axelson, StrÄ omberg and Weisbach (2009) study the ¯nancial
structure of private equity funds and ¯nd that the standard ¯nancial structure of private
equity investment funds maximizes the value of the fund. Their result would thus suggest
that the private equity fund structure is robust.
The lack of models for quantifying the investment costs for private equity investments
is a problem also for the fund manager when designing the fee structures. Di®erent funds
can have di®erent optimal designs for their incentive structures. An infrastructure fund
with long term safe investments could have a low ¯xed fee or an aggressive variable fee.
The choice of fee structure gives incentives to the fund manager and in turn in°uence the
choice of investments in the fund.
A model for calculating fees of funds with both ¯xed and variable fees allows for
comparison between funds with di®erent fee structures, also funds with only ¯xed fees.
Any combination of ¯xed and variable fees can be transformed to ¯xed fee equivalents,
as will be discussed (and exempli¯ed) later on. Certainly the comparisons cannot be
exact, since there are quite a few inputs that are di±cult to estimate, such as the asset
value process, the volatility of the fund's assets etc. However, a model that structures the
complex issue should take the analysis part of the way.
The fee structure creates incentives for the private equity fund manager to make
decisions on investments and ¯nancial structure. A model on fee structure makes it
possible to evaluate how di®erent choice on risk in°uences the income for the fund manager
and reversely the cost of the investor. It is conceivable that the option like characteristics
of the fee structure induces the fund manager to take on more risk in the investments
or the ¯nancial structure. The e®ects of increasing the ¯nancial risk are modeled and
discussed in section 3.
There are alternative ways to evaluate the costs of investing in private equity funds.
One way is to do it from empirical data, as Metrick and Yasuda (2009) does, or the net
e®ect of income and costs can be evaluated. Cumming, Siegel and Wright (2007) presents
earlier results on performance in private equity investment in their literature overview on
private equity. The evidence is a bit mixed on the performance of private equity funds,
for instance while Groh and Gottschalg (2006) ¯nds positive and statistically signi¯cant
alphas Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) ¯nds a risk adjusted under performance of 6
percent per year.3 The main problem that needs to be solved for studying private equity
3Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) assumes a ¯xed beta of 1 when they translate returns into alphas.
The ¯nancial structure of the private equity funds make this operation di±cult, since the funds consists
of invested capital and capital not yet invested (callable capital). Assuming that the investor of the fund
has the callable capital in liquid low risk assets both the alpha and the beta are close to zero for the
callable capital. This would decrease the over-all alpha and beta for the private equity investment. The
investors are in fact forced to hold low risk asset, against the potential capital call, and a leveraged equity
investment.
2fund performance is that there is little data to do it from. Groh and Gottschalg (2006)
creates a leveraged index from companies with similar operating performance. One con-
clusion the authors make is that it is important to do a comprehensive risk-adjustment
that considers both operating and leverage risk for performance assessment. The adjust-
ment for leverage does not only impact the performance of the private equity fund, but
also the expected fee.
In this paper I develop a model for calculating the expected cost of investing in a
private equity fund based on options theory. It is prudent to note that even if the costs
might be high, it can still be an attractive investment since there is also an expected
income from a private equity investment. Further, even if the cost is deducted from the
fund value the cost of investment is not necessarily negatively correlated with the returns.
Kaplan and Shoar (2005) ¯nd the returns of private equity investments to be persistent.
I.e. a successful private equity manager tends to continue to be successful and this could
motivate a higher fee for the successful manager than for a less successful manager.
The model I develop produce fees in general that, under realistic circumstances, pro-
duces results similar to the empirical ¯ndings of Metrick and Yasuda (2009) and Phalip-
pou and Gottschalg (2009). The model speci¯cally explains the result of Phalippou and
Gottschalg (2009) that the ¯xed part of the fees is the more important one, at least in a
setting where leverages of portfolio companies are close to the leverages of listed compa-
nies. The model provides a parametrization of what earlier studies have hinted at, namely
that the increase of ¯nancial risk bene¯ts the fund manager by an increase in the expected
fee. The private equity fund manager can in essence set the expected fee after investors
have committed their capital through fund managers' independent control over leverage
in the portfolio companies. This control gives incentives for risk shifting to the private
equity fund manager at the expense of the investors. Thus, there is a trade-o® between the
expected fee and the ¯nancial risk taken by the fund for a one-fund manager. The model
adds expected ¯xed and variable fees, making it possible to get ¯xed-fee equivalents to a
fee structure that has both ¯xed and variable fees. This allows for fee evaluations across
funds with di®erent fee structures. The model does not allow for extensive diversi¯cation,
but the e®ects of diversi¯cation in the funds is discussed and there might be reasons not
to maximize fees in each fund. For a fund manager with future fund projects, it might
not be an optimal strategy to maximize the expected fee for one fund. The reason for
this is that maximizing the expected fee can jeopardize future fund projects, hence there
is a dynamic strategy in fee structures and ¯nancial choices (a dynamic trade-o® between
expected fees and future project incomes).
In section 2 I describe the assumptions behind the model and design the model using
a ¯xed and one variable part. The section also contains an example, that show how costly
investing in a private equity fund is. In the next section the funds investments are levered,
to mimic the use of leverage by the fund managers. The has impact on the expected cost,
as described in Example 2. In section 4 the e®ects of portfolio diversi¯cation is described
3and analyzed. After this, the conclusions from the modeling are given.
2 Model objectives and design
There are a number of choices involved in designing a model for calculating the expected
fee. Each choice comes with advantages and disadvantages. I keep the model as basic a
possible, while I still keep the speci¯c characteristics of private equity funds, this to achieve
the goal of estimating the expected fee cost for a private equity investment. An example of
a choice is that the model is based on a call option on the fund rather than being designed
as a structural model. The use of a structural model would reduce the tractability of the
model in the next step, since it would require a compounded option to adjust for changes
in leverage. Some potentially important aspects of the fee structure is also left out, such
as catch-up provisions and clawbacks.4 Taxes are not modeled, since di®erent funds have
di®erent taxation schemes, and di®erent investors have di®erent taxation regulations.
2.1 The private equity fund setup
The private equity fund is not only a troublesome conglomerate, but have a di®erent
set of agreements governing its business than a normal conglomerate. Phalippou (2007)
and Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (2008) describes the general setup of a private equity ¯rm
in detail.5 For the purpose of this paper, it is su±cient to note a few things. There are
typically three parties involved in the ¯nancing of a private equity operation; the manager
of the fund (the general partner or fund manager), the investors of the fund (the limited
partners) and the lenders. The investments are carried through a limited partnership. At
the conception of the fund the investors commit to providing capital to the fund. The fund
manager then calls the committed capital on a deal by deal basis. This means that the
invested capital is less than the committed capital until the fund is fully invested. The
fund manager charges the fund a ¯xed fee (a percentage of the committed or invested
capital) and a variable fee (a percentage of the pro¯t above a hurdle rate).6 The funds
are closed end funds and are to be liquidated after a decade, but there is some °exibility
as to the exact date of the funds' closing.
4A catch-up clause means that the investor must receive his initial capital back before any variable
contributions are distributed to the private equity fund manager. A clawback clause means that previously
given variable fees are taken back if later deals are not su±ciently successful.
5Less detailed descriptions can also be found on the internet or in modern ¯nance textbooks, such as
Ross, Wester¯eld, Ja®e and Jordan (2008) pp570-573.
6The are di®erent ways to calculate the variables fee. Some funds, for instance, charge the variable
fee on realized income while others charge on estimated appreciation.
42.2 Model for calculating the expected fee
Metrick and Yasuda (2009) provide an in depth empirical investigation of fee types and
levels for private equity funds. There are a number of fees that are charged for private
equity investments, such as ¯xed fee (management fee), variable fee (incentive fee), trans-
action fee, monitoring fee and a fee covering the establishing costs. In this model, I will
only include the two largest fees; the ¯xed and the variable fees. Thus, the total fee, as
calculated here, consists of two parts; a ¯xed fee (fee level ff) on net asset value (NAV)
and a variable fee (fee level fv) on the income of the fund. Note that the variable fee is
dependent on the ¯xed fee level, since the ¯xed fee is deducted from the fund value. The
¯xed fee does not depend on anything but the current fund value.
The expected total fee is thus the sum of these two parts;
E [Fee] = E [Fixed] + E [V ariable]: (1)
To make it possible to calculate the expected value of the total fee some further assump-
tions have to be made. First, assume the only fees are the ¯xed and variable fees. The
other fees might have some economic importance but are small in relation to the ¯xed and
variable fees. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003), for instance, estimate an average transaction
fee for an acquirer to be 0.378 percent of transaction value during 1995-2000. Second, as-
sume the fund is fully invested at all times. If the fund is not fully invested, the estimated
fee will be higher in relation to the invested capital than the model predicts. In reality
private equity funds charge the fees on committed capital during an investment period (5
years according to Metrick and Yasuda (2009)) and then switch to invested capital for the
remainder of the funds life. The change in charging basis will typically cause the model
to overestimate the charged fee since invested capital typically is less than committed
capital after the investment period. There are two reason for the invested capital to be
less than the committed. The fund manager often does not ¯ll the fund with investments,
and when investments are exited the capital is returned to the limited partners. Third,
assume that there is no bias in the estimation of the NAV. There is no traded market for
the assets of the funds, so NAVs are calculated each quarter and often not reported until
a quarter later. The fact that the NAVs are used for calculating the ¯xed fee might give
rise to suspicion as to the quality and potential bias in the NAV ¯gures. There is a temp-
tation not to decrease the NAV, even if warranted, and thereby the ¯xed fee. Phalippou
(2007) describes this problem of sluggish intermediate valuations. Any 'intentional bias'
in the calculation of the NAV would tend to make the model underestimate the expected
fees. Fourth, assume that the invested capital (St) follows a Geometric Brownian Motion
(GBM);
dSt = (¹ ¡ ff)Stdt + ¾StdWt; (2)
where the drift is assumed to be the risk adjusted return (¹) minus the yearly continuous
¯xed fee (ff). The ¯xed fee is charged continuously as a simpli¯cation in the model. ¾
5is the volatility of returns and dW is the Wiener process of the invested capital. Stock
processes are often modeled using GBMs and since the assets of the private equity funds
are stocks, the private equity fund can be modeled in line with this as a portfolio of
stocks. The portfolio aspects of the expected fee from investing in a private equity fund
are discussed in section 4.
Under these assumptions the expected value of both the ¯xed and variable fees can
be calculated. The expected value of the ¯xed fee is (trivially) contingent on the invested
capital. The total ¯xed fee is calculated as the present value;





where proposition 4.2 from BjÄ ork (1998) has been used to calculate the expected value of
the GBM for the fee. The di®erence between estimating the total fee as fee level times
initial capital and estimating the fee using continuous compounding, as in equation (3),
is minute and the simpler method should su±ce in most settings. Some details on how
to calculate the ¯xed fee are presented in Appendix A.
If we assume that the variable fee is due at the end of the funds life, the variable fee
can be seen as a call option on the invested capital. Hence, there is a closed form solution
at hand for;












where h is the hurdle rate and r¤ is an unknown discount rate.7 It is unclear what the
discount rate should be, since it is does not reasonably exist a market to price this speci¯c
pay-o® at T. However, for analytical purposes r¤ can for instance be assumed to be zero,
so the estimated costs equal the sum of all costs without discounting. Noting that apart
from the variable fee and the time contingent hurdle rate we have an expression close to
the Black and Scholes (1973) option formula with continuous dividends (the distribution
of the ¯xed fee ff) which immediately gives the solution;
E [V ariable] = fvSt
¡
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;d2 = d1 ¡ ¾
p
T ¡ t: (6)
Some simpli¯ed details of the calculation are presented in Appendix B. The market
is incomplete in the sense that the fund is not a continuously traded security, so the
analogy with a call option is not exact. Fund shares are normally not traded other than
occasionally over the counter. However, since the funds typically invest in companies that
7It is unknown here, but in a risk free world, the unknown discount rate would be the risk free rate.
6could equally well be traded on an exchange the returns and risk for a private equity fund
can be replicated to some extent.8
Summing equation (3) and equation (5) gives an expression for the total expected fee;















where all inputs are de¯ned as before. From equation (7) it is clear that the expected fee
level behaves as could be anticipated. The fee level is decreasing in the hurdle rate, but
increasing in invested capital, return, ¯xed and variable fees. Perhaps not immediately
apparent, the fee level is increasing in the volatility, meaning that higher ¯nancial or
operational risk increases the expected fee for the fund manager.9 The reason increased
risk also increases the expected fee of the fund manager is that the fee increases when the
fund has been successful and increased in value, but does not decrease as much when the
fund has had poor outcomes.
Example 1. The fee level for a private equity fund can be estimated using equation
(7). For a fund with the following parameters, 2 percent ¯xed fee and 20 percent variable
fee above a hurdle rate of eight percent, interest rate of 5 percent, an 'unknown discount
rate' (r¤) set to the risk free rate, fund life is 10 years, and volatility of assets 25 per-
cent, the total expected fee is 19.4 percent of invested capital.10,11 The asset volatility ha
deliberately been set close to what can be seen as an index volatility, so as not to exag-
gerate the results. The sensitivity for choice of input variables is described in appendix D.
Since the total fee consists of two parts, the ¯xed and the variable, there are many
combinations that generates the same expected fee. For the parameters in Example 1 the
combinations between ¯xed and variable fee which give 19.4 percent are drawn in Figure
1 below. Fractions are presented on the axes. Using combinations of ¯xed and variable fee
components, an iso-fee line can be drawn, as in Figure 1 for any choice of total cost. From
equation (7) the ¯xed or variable fee can be calculated as a function of total fee, making
it possible to calculate the iso fee lines. Fee combinations on iso fee lines that are further
out to the right of the drawn line are more costly for the investor. Fee combinations on
iso fee lines that are below and to the left of the drawn line are less costly for the investor.
8Cochrane (2005) ¯nd that a sample of very small Nasdaq stocks have similar return characteristics as
investments in venture capital. However, the very small Nasdaq ¯rms' returns do not explain the venture
capital investment returns, suggesting they are similar phenomena, but not the same. Hwang, Quigley
and Woodward (2005) develop a method for calculating return when price information is infrequent and
¯nds lower returns than Cochrane using the same data set.




10Gompers and Lerner (1999b) ¯nds in their sample of venture capitalists that most receive 20 percent
in variable compensation. Metrick and Yasuda (2009) ¯nds that all of their buy-out funds receive 20
percent in variable compensation. The ¯xed compensation varies more for the buy-out funds, where 41
percent of funds receive 2 percent and 51 percent less than 2 percent.
11If the unknown interest rate is set to zero, the expected fee increases to 20.3 percent.
7[¯gure 1 here]
Figure 1 Fee combinations that generate the same expected fee.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 Adding leverage in the portfolio companies
A notable feature of buy-outs is that the private equity manager increases the level of
debt in the ¯nancing mix of the companies they buy. According to Groh and Gottschalg
(2006) leverage is then decreased during the holding period. Here the time variation of
the leverage will not be considered. There are several arguments for the increase of debt
¯nancing in the acquired companies. One argument for this increase of debt ¯nancing is
that more debt increases the value of the tax shield in accordance with the reasoning of
8Modigliani and Miller (1958). Another argument, based on the ideas of Jensen (1986), is
that a high level of debt decrease the free cash °ow of the ¯rm which keep the management
of the company focused on running and optimizing the operations. However, as I will
show in this analysis, there might be an additional reason. An increase in debt level also
increases the expected fee for the private equity fund manager, regardless if the value
of the ¯rm increases or stays the same. The fee structure gives incentives to the fund
manager to increase the risk of the investment due to the option like element of the fee
structure. The result from an increase in the ¯nancial risk (leverage) is explored in this
section.
Even if leverage is a notable feature, it is not the only tool that the private equity man-
agers work with. They also work with improving the operational e±ciency. BergstrÄ om,
Grubb and Jonsson (2007) ¯nds that private equity buy-out managers in Sweden between
1998 and the ¯rst half of 2006 create a signi¯cant amount of value through operational
improvements. This ¯nding indicates that the underlying asset value process might be
di®erent when an investment is acquired by a private equity fund. The model does not
take this di®erence into account, so it might be worth noting that in calibrating the model
the drift term (at least) cannot be accurately calibrated on listed companies. Given that
the private equity fund manager would typically increase the operating performance this
will cause my model to underestimate the fees in comparison to using the asset price
development process of a listed company.
A change in leverage changes the ¯nancial risk of the investment and this is modeled
using a structural model. This modeling allows for calculating the change in volatility
of the investment when the leverage is changed. Assuming that the total value of the
portfolio assets (V ) follows a (di®erent) GBM, the value of the equity of the PE fund is a
call option on the assets of the fund and denoted C(:::)) in line with the idea of Merton
(1974).12 Using this assumptions we can specify the relation between the (¯xed) volatility
of the assets (¾v) and the volatility of the equity (¾). According to Lando (2004) p. 42






When only equity is used in the ¯nancing mix, the asset volatility and the equity
volatility are the same. As debt is introduced into the ¯nancing mix this equality is no
longer valid and equity volatility increases in accordance with equation (8). In fact, equity
volatility is strictly increasing in leverage, see appendix C for proof.
12Note that this is a di®erent option than the one used to calculate the variable part of the fee. The
variable part of the fee can be seen as a call option on the equity of the fund. The equity of the fund
is a call option on the assets of the fund. Hence the variable part of the fee can be seen as a compound
option on the assets of the fund.
9Example 2. Assume that the debt to asset ratio was equal to 25 percent in Exam-
ple 1. All other parameters are the same. In this example the leverage of the acquired
company is increased the from 25 percent to 75 percent debt to assets.13 To ¯gure out
what the expected fee is, we need to do this in three steps. The ¯rst step is to calculate
the implicit volatility of assets from equation (8). The second step is to calculate the
volatility of the invested capital after the debt to asset ratio is changed using the same
equation. The third step is to apply the new volatility to equation (7) to get an estimate
of the total fee after the leverage change.
From an equity volatility of 25 percent the implied asset volatility can be calculated in
the ¯rst step using numerical methods to be about 18.7 percent. Using this asset volatility
and changing the debt to asset ratio to 75 percent, gives a volatility for the invested capital
of 56.9 percent. This new volatility substantially raises the expected variable fee from
2.3 percent to about 10.0 percent for a total of 25.7 percent in relation to the invested
capital.
Increasing the leverage, as in example 2, and plotting the new trade-o® line in the
same way as in Figure 1 shows that we have reached a higher 'iso fee' line. The two lines
have di®erent expected fee levels (19.4 percent and 25.7 percent respectively).
[¯gure 2 here]
The curve shifts to the right when the volatility is adjusted for the higher leverage,
indicating a higher iso fee level. Clearly the di®erence in level is explained by the variable
fee, since this is the part of the fee that is sensitive to changes in volatility. Perhaps not
readily visible in Figure 2 is that the gap between the two iso fee lines is decreasing in the
¯xed fee. This is due to the fact that the risk in the second fee structure is higher. That is,
substituting ¯xed fee for variable fee requires compensation for risk. This 'compensation'
presupposes that the fund manager is risk neutral. Further, since both the ¯xed and the
variable fee are kept at the same nominal level, it is possible to calculate what level of
¯xed fee corresponds to changing the leverage. Instead of raising the leverage, the private
equity fund manager could raise the ¯xed fee to 2.8 percent per year, meaning that the
shift in leverage corresponds to about 0.8 percent in expected fee per year for the fund
manager.
The decisions of the private equity fund managers on ¯nancial and operational risk
in°uences the fee they can expect to receive. From the limited partners' point of view
this is a governance problem. The limited partners need to assure that the ¯nancial
structures of the ¯rms in their private equity funds are optimal for value creation in the
fund and not (only) to maximize the expected fee to the fund manager. However, even if
there are strong incentives for the private equity fund managers to increase the leverage
13As a comparison the average market leverage for the ¯rms in the S&P 500 industrials index was 23.5
percent at year end 2007. The median market leverage was 16.6 percent at the end of 2007. According
to data from Standard & Poor's Leveraged Commentary & Data, the debt share in European buy-outs
between 2003 and 2007 varied between 66.1 percent and 67.5 percent.
10Figure 2 Fee combinations that generate the same expected fee for high and low leverage.



























in the investments it is not necessarily always the best strategy for the fund manager to
maximize leverage. There are reasons why maximum leverage is not always chosen;
² leverage puts the fee at risk for the general partner,
² lenders limit the possible leverage, and
² the general partner wants to raise additional funds in the future.
If the general partner is risk neutral then increasing the leverage is only a matter of
higher expected income. If the general partner does care about putting the fee at risk,
this will make it less attractive to increase the leverage. If there is a bad outcome in
the investments then not only is there no variable fee, but also the ¯xed fee will (slowly)
decrease since it is based on the invested capital. The loans needed to leverage the ¯rms
in the funds are given by banks and other lenders. The lenders set up conditions in the
loan covenants to protect their interests. Dichev and Skinner (2002) presents a frequency
table over di®erent covenants for their sample of private lending agreements. The three
most common covenants are 'Debt to cash Flow', 'Interest Coverage', and 'Fixed Charge
Coverage'. These covenants are present in 37.7 percent, 36.7 percent and 34.4 percent of
their full sample. Leverage covenants are not as common as cash °ow to debt covenants.
'Debt to Tangible Net worth'and 'Leverage ratio' are present in 21.7 percent and 17.5
percent of the full sample. These ¯gures suggest that lenders focus on the ability of
the borrowing ¯rms ability to service their debt. This is perhaps the reason why the
leverage ratios can be so high in private equity owned ¯rms. Since the limited partner
11have a similar governance problem as the lenders, it could be envisioned that they would
require 'covenants' on debt just as the debt holders, but this does not seems to be the
practice. Gompers and Lerner (1999a) show that fund manager performance has a drastic
e®ect on fund raising. Both the value of equity in ¯rms taken public the current year and
previous years have a positive e®ect on the ability of the fund manager to raise new funds.
Hence, older fund managers have a higher ability to raise new funds. This means that
the reputation of a fund manager is important for success in future fund raising. This
fact give the fund manager incentives not to maximize leverage, since it might jeopardize
possible future return from having a good reputation. Hence, over a longer time horizon
high leverage might not any longer be an optimal strategy. The ¯rst two items should
give raise to a static trade-o® for the ¯nancial choice of one fund. The fund manager
maximizes the expected fee given the conditions set by his risk preferences and the banks
willingness to lend. The third point limits the ¯nancial choices by the fund manager over
time, thus creating a dynamic trade-o®.
4 Portfolio diversi¯cation's e®ect on the expected fee
Each private equity fund invest in several companies. Until now, the analysis in this paper
has been based on a single asset.14 However, since the funds invest in many companies
the fund has a diversi¯ed portfolio. The diversi¯cation e®ect reduces the risk and the
importance of the variable fee in the total cost of the fund investment. The reason
for this can be found in the "vega risk" of the fee. The vega risk is a function with a
positive relation to fund return volatility (the square root of covariance). This means that
diversi¯cation, which reduces the variance of the portfolio, also decreases the expected fee
for the fund manager.
Unfortunately it is not possible to disaggregate the invested capital, as described in
equation (2), by modeling the underlying investment components as GBMs. The reason
for this is that the sum of two or more GBMs is only a GBM under very strict conditions.
These strict conditions make the operation of creating a portfolio meaningless since the
resulting portfolio would not be a good model of a private equity portfolio. However, the
e®ects of diversi¯cation of the private equity fund investments can be described using well
known, and simpler methods.
Diversi¯cation a®ects the variable part of the private equity fee calculation, and has
no impact on the value of the ¯xed fee. The in°uence on the fee is carried through the
variance of the portfolio returns. The calculation of the portfolio variance for the two
asset case is described in ¯nance textbooks, see for instance Ross et al. (2008) pp 286-288,
and can be written (in vector form);
­p = W­W
0; (9)
14The 'single asset' can of course be seen as the aggregated total portfolio.
12where W is a row vector with the portfolio weights, ­ is the covariance matrix of the
portfolio assets, and ­p is the variance of the portfolio. The portfolio variance depends
on the variance of the components and their covariances (­i;j) with each other, i.e. how the
value of the di®erent investments change together. Disregarding the highly unlikely case
with perfect correlation between all portfolio assets, the diversi¯cation e®ect decreases
the expect variability of the private equity funds portfolio, as compared to the sum of the
variance for the individual holdings. This is of course the standard diversi¯cation e®ect
present in any portfolio. The point here being that the diversi¯cation e®ect reduces the
expected fee.15
Higher correlations decrease the e®ect of diversi¯cation, and this might be one reason
for sector focus in the PE fund industry. Companies in the same sector tend to have more
similar pay-o® patterns then companies in di®erent sectors. However, there are other
reasons that are plausible for this focus. A sector focus bene¯ts a PE fund manager in
several ways, apart from the high correlations. A sector focus improves deal generation
since not only is the fund manager familiar with the sector, but can be seen as a natural
partner for other companies in the sector. It also helps the PE manager in the next step
in the acquisition process since it improves the quality of the due diligence and enhances
the ability to identify necessary strategic changes. A sector focus can also improve the
chances when the PE fund manager wishes to exit the investment. If the sector is familiar
it is easier to identify the right buyer and to value the investment.
An investor can of course diversify the portfolio without the help of any speci¯c fund
manager, so the correlations in the PE fund investment might not in°uence the overall
characteristics of the portfolio. However, diversi¯cation of the portfolio outside the level
of the private equity fund has no impact on the total expected fees. In the extreme case it
might be preferable to invest in one PE fund with many di®erent holdings than to invest
in several PE funds. The reason for this is that there is no diversi¯cation e®ect on the
fees outside the individual funds. The investor might, for example, be sinking well below
the high watermark in one fund, while paying variable fee on another.
5 Conclusions
The model I develop in this paper describes how value is divided between on the one hand
people who contribute their skills and wits and on the other hand investors who contribute
their capital to joint projects. A surprising result is that the people who contribute their
skills has control over the size of the remuneration they receive. The ¯nding that the
fund manager can control the expected fee level through control over the ¯nancial risk
(leverage), raises the issue of potential con°icts of interest between the fund manager and
the investor.
15Remember the "vega risk" as described earlier.
13Before introducing leverage, the main part of the expected fee consists of the present
value of the ¯xed fee. This might be a bit unexpected, since the variable fee seems high
(20 percent of returns above the hurdle rate of 8 percent). This ¯nding is in line with what
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) ¯nds in his empirical study. However, after adjusting for
leverage the share of the variable fee out of the total fee increases (in Example 2 it is just
below 40 percent of the expected total fee). The increasing importance of the variable fee
in connection with changes in leverage give the fund manager incentives to increase the
¯nancial risk, but there are also reasons for not maximizing the expected fee. In essence
there is a static trade-o® for the fund manager in leverage. The expected enhanced pro¯t
from raising the leverage of the fund is at some point neutralized by the increase in risk.
The main reason for the fund manager not to maximize the expected return from one
fund is that, given that it is pro¯table to manage a fund, the fund manager can jeopardize
his reputation by increasing the risk of poor outcomes too much. The reputations e®ect
is strong, since successful fund managers tend to continue to be successful, and this will
put a soft limit of what the optimal long run leverage is.
A Calculating the ¯xed fee
Starting with the GBM of the capital;
dSt = (¹ ¡ ff)Stdt + ¾StdWt: (10)
The ¯xed fee is calculated as the invested capital (St) times the ¯xed fee (ff). Since the
fee is ¯xed we can use proposition 4.2 in BjÄ ork (1998) to get the expected value of the
¯xed fee function at each time (index s);
E [Fixedjt=s] = ffSte
(r¡ff)s: (11)
Discounting with e¡r(s¡t) to t and summing the expected ¯xed fee over the holding period
(T ¡ t) gives us the sum of the expected fee;

















B Calculating the variable fee
The variable fee is as de¯ned in equation (5);












14Noting that the P-dynamics in equation (2) can be rewritten and solved as;





, where Z is a stochastic variable with a standard normal distribution. The closed form
for the expected value can be calculated;

















































and d2 = d1 ¡ ¾
p
T ¡ t: (16)
C Proof of increasing equity volatility in leverage
Assume alpha (® 2 (0;1)) is the equity share of the assets (V ), where the assets are neither








where I assume that value of the equity of the fund can be seen as a standard call option.
Due to this assumption, the derivative of the call option (the delta) is N (dc
1). For a
standard call option where the stock price is substituted with assets and the strike price




c . Where b = (r+¾2
v=2)(T ¡t) and c = ¾v
p
T ¡ t. b
is not part of the derivative of N(dc
1) against ® and c is always positive, so neither b nor




15is true then equity volatility is increasing in increasing leverage. The derivative of equity











































































The ¯rst term is always positive for the allowed values of the parameters, so it can be


























































holds, then the equity volatility is decreasing in increasing equity share and thus it is


























, and for ® ! 0 expression (21) is ful¯lled at the limit. So equity volatility is strictly mono-
tonically decreasing in equity to assets and thus equity volatility is strictly monotonically
increasing in debt to assets.
16u2 is smaller than or equal to (dc
1)2 and thus the expression is always positive.
16D Input variable sensitivity
The input variables selected for the example are reasonable, but they are by no means
¯xed. The impact on the expected fee from changing one variable at a time can, for
Example 1, be seen in Table 1. In this table I ¯rst show both how much the expected
fee changes when one variable is changed by -10, -5, 0, +5, and +10 percent and then
what the variables needs to be to produce an expected fee that is 10 percent higher or
lower. The idea with the ¯rst set of columns is to show the sensitivity of the expected
fee against the input variables. I calculate the variable needed in the last two columns to
illustrate the relative importance of each variable. I.e. The e®ect of changing the ¯xed
fee from 2 percent to 1.75 percent is the same as changing the volatility from 25 percent
to 2.4 percent.
Table 1. Sensitivity analysis for Example 1
Variable Fee level with change in variable Variable value for fee change
-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10-10 percent +10 percent
Interest 0.19240.19330.19430.19530.1964 N/A 0.0822
Hurdle rate 0.19580.19500.19430.19360.1929 0.8440 -0.0000
Volatility 0.19050.19230.19430.19630.1985 0.0240 0.3546
Fixed fee 0.17850.18640.19430.20200.2097 0.0176 0.0225
Variable fee0.19300.19360.19430.19490.1956 N/A 0.4989
End time 0.17660.18550.19430.20290.2115 8.9041 11.1295
In this table the ¯rst ¯ve columns presentes the expected fee level when one
input is changed. The last two columns decribe the level of the parameter
that results in a +/- 10 percent change in fee level. When there is no value
on the input that will produce the change in fee, it is replaced with a zero.
The relative importance of the ¯xed fee can be seen also in Table 1, both direct in the
¯xed fee row and indirect in the end time row. In Table 2, the same sensitivity analysis
is presented for Example 2.
Table 2. Sensitivity analysis for Example 2
Variable Fee level with change in variable Variable value for fee change
-0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10-10 percent +10 percent
Interest 0.25170.25430.25700.25970.2626 0.0215 0.0707
Hurdle rate 0.25870.25790.25700.25610.2551 0.1844 N/A
Volatility 0.24590.25150.25700.26230.2674 0.4401 0.7172
Fixed fee 0.24260.24980.25700.26400.2710 0.0164 0.0237
Variable fee0.24940.25320.25700.26080.2645 0.1321 0.2679
End time 0.23710.24710.25700.26660.2760 8.7169 11.3629
In this table the ¯rst ¯ve columns presentes the expected fee level when one
input is changed. The last two columns decribe the level of the parameter
that results in a +/- 10 percent change in fee level. When there is no value
on the input that will produce the change in fee, it is replaced with a zero.
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